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Abstract
We investigate the issue of strategic substitutability/complementarity in a
Cournot diﬀerential game with sticky prices. We show that first order condi-
tions do not produce instantaneous best reply functions. However, we identify
negatively sloped reaction functions in steady state, with the open-loop best
reply being flatter than its closed-loop counterpart.
JEL classification: C73, D43, D92, L13.
Keywords: complementarity/substitutability, diﬀerential games, reac-
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1 Introduction
The issue of super-/submodularity has been investigated mostly in static
games, and refers to the slope of reaction functions in the (stage) game,
as initially pointed out by Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985).1 A
potential development of this discussion consists in investigating whether
the same properties can be reconstructed in a diﬀerential game, and to what
extent.2
To the best of our knowledge, only Jun and Vives (2004) have consid-
ered intertemporal strategic complementarity/substitutability. They com-
pare steady states of open-loop and stable closed-loop equilibria in a general
symmetric diﬀerential duopoly model with adjustment costs, as in Reynolds
(1987) and Driskill and McCaﬀerty (1989). One of the most interesting result
appears in the “mixed” case of price competition and production adjustment
costs: the strategic complementarity of the static game turns into an in-
tertemporal strategic substitutability, given that, from the standpoint of any
given firm, a price cut today makes the rival smaller in the future by raising
its short-run marginal cost.
1The concept of economic complementarity has recently emerged as a leading theme
of economic research and has benefitted from the development of the theory of super-
modular games, introduced by Topkis (1978) and based on lattice-theoretic arguments.
The analysis has been focused on games with strategic complementarities and their use
in industrial economics (Vives, 1990; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990 and Amir, 1996) and in
comparative statics analysis (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994). In the presence of comple-
mentarity relationships between diﬀerent units of a global system, a separate study of any
unit alone, ceteris paribus, could lead to a wrong interpretation of the phenomenon under
consideration.
2See Dockner et al. (2000) and Mehlmann (1988) for the theory of diﬀerential games
and its appications to economics.
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A related issue is that of conjectural variations. Dockner (1992) shows
that any closed-loop (i.e., subgame perfect) equilibrium coincides with a con-
jectural variations equilibrium. Using a Cournot model with linear demand
and quadratic production costs, he proves that the dynamic conjectural vari-
ations consistent with the closed-loop equilibrium are negative constants
which, depending upon the level of the discount rate, vary between zero
and the consistent conjectures characterising the static version of the same
game.
The aim of the present paper is to identify best reply functions in a
Cournot diﬀerential game with sticky prices a` la Simaan and Takayama
(1978) and Fershtman and Kamien (1987). In general, a dynamic game
of the type proposed here may either generate instantaneous best replies di-
rectly from the first order conditions on controls, or yield best replies at the
steady state only. The emergence of the first or the second case ultimately
depends upon whether the first order condition taken w.r.t. the output level
of any given firm contains the outputs of her rivals or not. In the model
we investigate, the second case holds both under the open-loop solution and
the closed-loop one. This implies that, at any time during the game, each
firm has a dominant strategy independent of the rivals’ behaviour. A proper
strategic interaction only emerges when one imposes stationarity on the dy-
namics of state and control variables. At the steady state, best replies are
negatively sloped, with closed-loop best replies being always steeper than
open-loop ones, to indicate that strategic interaction is stronger in the for-
mer case than in the latter. Moreover, we also show that, if price stickiness is
infinitely high, the types of equilibria coincide with the perfectly competitive
outcome which can be computed in the static model.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the issue of
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identifying reaction functions using a general diﬀerential game framework.
The sticky price game, and its open-loop and closed-loop solutions are inves-
tigated in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Consider a generic diﬀerential game, played over continuous time, with t ∈
[0,∞).3 The set of players is P ≡ {1, 2, ...N}. Moreover, let xi(t) and ui(t)
define, as usual, the state variable and the control variable pertaining to
player i. Assume there exists a prescribed set Ui such that any admissible
action ui(t) ∈ Ui. The dynamics of player i’s state variable is described by
the following:
dxi(t)
dt
≡ .xi(t) = fi (x(t),u(t)) (1)
where x(t) = (x1 (t) , x2 (t) , ...xN (t)) is the vector of state variables at time
t, and u(t) = (u1 (t) , u2 (t) , ...uN (t)) is the vector of players’ actions at the
same date, i.e., it is the vector of control variables at time t. That is, in
the most general case, the dynamics of the state variable associated with
player i depends on all state and control variables associated with all players
involved in the game. The value of the state variables at t = 0 is assumed to
be known: x(0) = (x1 (0) , x2 (0) , ...xN (0)) .
Each player has an objective function, defined as the discounted value of
the flow of payoﬀs over time. The instantaneous payoﬀ depends upon the
choices made by player i as well as its rival, that is:
πi ≡ πi (x(t),u(t)) . (2)
3One could also consider a finite terminal time T. The specific choice of the time horizon
is immaterial to the ensuing analysis, provided that terminal conditions are appropriately
defined.
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Player i’s objective is then, given uj (t) , j 6= i :
max
ui(·)
Ji ≡
Z ∞
0
πi(x(t),u(t))e
−ρtdt (3)
subject to the dynamic constraint represented by the behaviour of the state
variables, (1), ui(t) ∈ Ui and initial conditions x(0) = (x1 (0) , x2 (0) , ...xN (0)) .
The Hamiltonian of player i is:
Hi (x(t),u(t)) ≡ e−ρt [πi (x(t),u(t)) + λii(t) · fi (x(t),u(t))+
+
X
j 6=i
λij(t) · fj (x(t),u(t))] , (4)
where λij(t) = µij(t)e
ρt is the co-state variable (evaluated at time t) that
firm i associates with the state variable xj (t) .
The interesting property, in the present perspective, is summarised by
the second cross-derivative w.r.t. controls:
∂2Hi
∂ui∂uj
(5)
Two cases are possible:
• If
∂2Hi
∂ui∂uj
6= 0 (6)
then the first order condition (FOC)
∂Hi
∂ui
= 0 (7)
yields the instantaneous best reply function of player i against any
admissible choice of player j at any time t, and
sgn
µ
∂2Hi
∂ui∂uj
¶
(8)
is the slope of such best reply function.
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• If instead
∂2Hi
∂ui∂uj
= 0∀j 6= i, (9)
then the FOC does not yield an instantaneous best reply function. The
necessary and suﬃcient condition for (9) to hold is additive separability
of the Hamiltonian of player i w.r.t. control variables. In this situation,
it must be nonetheless true that the expression ∂Hi/∂ui contains the
co-state variables. Hence, in order to solve for the equilibrium path of
ui, one has to take the derivative of (7) w.r.t. t. This yields:
·
ui = zi
µ ·
λii,
·
λij,
·
xi,
·
xj
¶
(10)
where
·
xi,
·
xj are given by state equations (1), and the dynamics of the
co-state variables λii and λij comes from the co-state equations:
−∂Hi
∂xi
−
X
j 6=i
∂Hi
∂uj
∂u∗j
∂xi
=
·
λii − ρλii (11)
If (11) contains (ui, uj) , then, by substitution, we will observe
·
ui =
wi (ui, uj). Imposing
·
ui = 0, one obtains u
∗
i = vi (uj) representing the
best reply against the choice of j in the steady state equilibrium.
The diﬀerence between the two cases lies in the fact that while in the
first case we observe an instantaneous reaction function characterising the
optimal behaviour of player i at any time during the game, in the second
case we only observe player i’s best reply at the steady state equilibrium,
while i’s optimal behaviour during the transition to the steady state can be
characterised in terms of states and co-states only, regardless of any player
j’s control. This amounts indeed to saying that along the path to the steady
state each player has a dominant strategy. This discussion is summarised by:
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Remark 1 If player i’s Hamiltonian is additively separable w.r.t. controls,
then ∂2Hi/∂ui∂uj = 0 and each player i has a dominant strategy at every
instant.
To better illustrate this point, we resort to a model with sticky prices a`
la Fershtman and Kamien (1987).
3 Sticky prices
This model dates back to Simaan and Takayama (1978) and Fershtman and
Kamien (1987). Consider an oligopoly where, at any t ∈ [0,∞), N single-
product firms produce quantities qi(t), i ∈ {1, 2, ...N}, of the same homoge-
neous good at a total cost Ci(t) = cqi(t) + [qi(t)]
2
/2, c > 0. In each period,
market demand determines the notional price level:
bp(t) = A− NX
i=1
qi(t).
In general, however, bp(t) will diﬀer from the current price level p(t), due to
price stickiness, and price moves according to the following equation:
dp(t)
dt
≡ ·p = s {bp(t)− p(t)} (12)
Notice that the dynamics described by (12) establishes that price adjusts
proportionately to the diﬀerence between the price level given by the inverse
demand function and the current price level, the speed of adjustment being
determined by the constant s ∈ [0,∞).
This amounts to saying that the price mechanism is sticky, that is, firms
face menu costs in adjusting their price to the demand conditions deriving
from consumers’ preferences: they may not (and, in general, they will not)
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choose outputs so that the price reaches immediately bp(t), except in the limit
case where s tends to infinity.
The instantaneous profit function of firm i is:
πi(t) = qi(t) ·
·
p(t)− c− 1
2
qi(t)
¸
. (13)
Hence, the problem of firm i is:
max
qi(t)
Ji =
Z ∞
0
e−ρt qi(t) ·
·
p(t)− c− 1
2
qi(t)
¸
dt (14)
subject to (12) and to the conditions p(0) = p0, and p(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈
[0,∞) .
We solve the game by considering - in turn - the open-loop solution and
the closed-loop memoryless solution.4
3.1 The open-loop solution
Here we look for the open-loop Nash equilibrium, i.e., we examine a situation
where firms commit to a production plan at t = 0 and stick to that plan
forever.
The Hamiltonian function is:
Hi(t) = e−ρt ·
(
qi(t) ·
·
p(t)− c− 1
2
qi(t)
¸
+ λi(t)s
"
A−
NX
i=1
qi(t)− p(t)
#)
,
(15)
where λi(t) = µi(t)e
ρt, and µi(t) is the co-state variable associated to p(t). In
the remainder of the section, superscript OL indicates the open-loop equi-
librium level of a variable. Consider the first order condition (FOC) w.r.t.
4For a thourough analysis of open-loop, memoryless closed-loop and fedback solutions,
see Cellini and Lambertini (2004).
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qi(t), calculated using (15):
∂Hi(t)
∂qi(t)
= p(t)− c− qi(t)− λi(t)s = 0 . (16)
This yields the optimal open-loop output for firm i, as follows:5
qi(t) =



p(t)− c− λi(t)s if p(t) > c+ λi(t)s
0 otherwise.
(17)
Observe that, on the basis of (16-17), one cannot write a best reply function
for player i against his rivals at time t.
The adjoint condition for the optimum are:
−∂Hi(t)
∂p(t)
=
·
µi ⇔
·
λi = λi(t)(s+ ρ)− qi(t) , (18)
while the transversality condition requires:
lim
t→∞
µi(t) · p(t) = 0 . (19)
Diﬀerentiating (17), we obtain:
·
qi =
·
p− s
·
λi (20)
which, using (18), can be rewritten as follows:
·
qi =
·
p− s [(ρ+ s)λi(t)− qi(t)] . (21)
Now, substitute into (21) (i) the law of motion of the price,
·
p = s {bp(t)− p(t)} ,
with bp(t) = A − qi(t) −Pj 6=i qj (t) , and (ii) sλi(t) = p(t) − c − qi(t) from
(17). This yields:
·
qi = s
"
A− qi(t)−
X
j 6=i
qj (t)− p (t)
#
− (s+ ρ) [p(t)− c− qi(t)] + sqi(t) = 0
(22)
5In the remainder, we consider the positive solution. Obviously, the derivation of the
steady state entails non-negativity constraints on price and quantity, that we assume to
be satisfied.
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in:
q∗i (t) =
s
P
j 6=i qj (t)− sA− (s+ ρ)c+ (2s+ ρ)p(t)
s+ ρ
. (23)
Now imposing stationarity on (12), we obtain:
·
p = 0 in p∗ = bp = A− qi(t)−X
j 6=i
qj (t) (24)
which can be plugged into (23), yielding:
q∗i =
(s+ ρ)
³
A− c−
P
j 6=i qj
´
3s+ 2ρ
. (25)
Expression (25) is the best reply function of firm i at the open-loop equilib-
rium, with slope:
∂q∗i
∂qj
= − s+ ρ
3s+ 2ρ
< 0 . (26)
This allows us to state the following:
Lemma 2 At the open-loop equilibrium, the best reply function of firm i
is negatively sloped for all s, ρ ∈ [0,∞) . In absolute value, the slope is ev-
erywhere decreasing in s. In the limit, as s tends to infinity (or ρ tends to
zero), ∂q∗i /∂qj = −1/3, while as s tends to zero (or ρ tends to infinity),
∂q∗i /∂qj = −1/2.
Now we can introduce the symmetry condition qj(t) = qi(t) for all j, so
as to obtain:
dq(t)
dt
= sA+ (s+ ρ)c− (2s+ ρ)p(t) + [ρ−Ns] q(t) (27)
Note that dq(t)/dt = 0 is a linear relationship between p(t) and q(t). This, to-
gether with dp(t)/dt = 0, also a linear function, fully characterise the steady
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state of the system. The dynamic system can be immediately rewritten in
matrix form as follows:


·
p
·
q

 =

 −s −sN
−(2s+ ρ) ρ− sN




p
q

+


sA
sA+ (s+ ρ)c

 (28)
As the determinant of the above 2 × 2 matrix is negative, the equilibrium
point is a saddle, with
qOL =
(A− c)(s+ ρ)
(s+ ρ)(N + 1) + s
; pOL = A−NqOL . (29)
As in the duopoly case described by Fershtman and Kamien (1987 pp. 1159-
61), also here the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium price and output
©
pCN , qCN
ª
obtain from (29), in the limit, when ρ → 0 or s → ∞. For all positive lev-
els of the discount rate and for any finite speed of adjustment, the static
Cournot price (output) is higher (lower) than the open-loop equilibrium price
(output). Moreover, for either ρ→∞ or s→ 0, the open-loop steady state
equilibrium
©
pCN , qCN
ª
exactly replicates the perfectly competitive outcome
that would emerge from the static model, for any N ≥ 1 (see Fershtman and
Kamien, 1987, Proposition 1, p. 1156):
lim
s→0
qOL = lim
ρ→∞
qOL =
A− c
N + 1
; lim
s→0
pOL = lim
ρ→∞
pOL =
A+Nc
N + 1
. (30)
From Lemma 2, we know that in such a case ∂q∗i /∂qj = −1/2; hence, one
may ask why the price coincides with marginal cost in a game with negatively
sloped best replies, and, even more striking, in the monopoly setting which
obtains when N = 1. The intuitive explanation is that, if s = 0, then firms
are unable to aﬀect the notional price through any change in output levels,
which is the only available instrument to influence the variation of the current
price level. Therefore, independently of market structure, when the current
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price is infinitely sticky, firms are obliged to behave as price-takers, as if they
were supplying a perfectly competitive market. This of course holds for a
monopolist as well. In the static game, it can be easily ascertained that the
perfectly competitive outcome is reached only when N tends to infinity.
Finally, if either s tends to infinity or ρ tends to zero, the open-loop
steady state equilibrium coincides with the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium
where qCN = (A− c) / (N + 2) , as it can be verified using qOL in (29).
3.2 The closed-loop solution
The closed-loop memoryless solution remains to investigate. We use super-
script CL to denote the closed-loop equilibrium levels of the relevant vari-
ables. The Hamiltonian of firm i is given by (15), with the same initial and
transversality conditions. The first order condition w.r.t. qi, calculated using
(15), obviously coincide with condition (16) calculated in the open-loop case:
∂Hi
∂qi
= p− c− qi − λis = 0 . (31)
This yields the closed-loop output for firm i, as follows (again, in the remain-
der we shall consider only the positive solution):
qCLi =



p− c− λis if p > c+ λis
0 otherwise.
(32)
Note that the kinematic equation of qCLi is described by (20), as in the open-
loop case. The adjoint conditions for the optimum are:
−∂Hi
∂p
−
X
j 6=i
∂Hi
∂qj
∂qCLj
∂p
=
·
λi − ρλi (33)
Now consider that
∂Hi
∂qj
= −λis ;
∂qCLj
∂p
= 1 . (34)
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Therefore: X
j 6=i
∂Hi
∂qj
∂qCLj
∂p
= − (N − 1)λis (35)
is the additional term in the co-state equation, characterising the strategic
interaction among firms, which is not considered by definition in the open-
loop solution.
Equation (33) may be rewritten as
·
λi = (Ns+ ρ)λi−qi. This expression,
together with sλ(t) = p(t)−c−qi(t) and
·
p = s
n
A− qi(t)−
P
j 6=i qj (t)− p(t)
o
,
can be substituted into (20) to obtain:
·
qi = [qi(t) + c] (ρ+Ns)− p (t) [ρ+ s (N + 1)]− s
X
j 6=i
qj (t) (36)
with
·
qi = 0 in:
q∗i (t) =
p (t) [ρ+ s (N + 1)]− c (ρ+Ns) + s
P
j 6=i qj (t)
ρ+Ns
. (37)
Now, imposing the stationarity on price,
·
p = 0, and substituting into (37),
we can write:
q∗i =
(ρ+Ns)
³
A− c−
P
j 6=i qj
´
2ρ+ s (2N + 1)
(38)
that represents the best reply of firm i under the closed-loop solution. On
the basis of the above expression, we have:
∂q∗i (t)
∂qj(t)
¯¯¯¯
CL
= − ρ+Ns
2ρ+ s (2N + 1)
;
¯¯¯¯
∂ [∂q∗i (t)/∂qj(t)]
∂s
¯¯¯¯
= − ρ
[2ρ+ s (2N + 1)]2
< 0 .
(39)
This entails that the closed-loop best reply has the same qualitative proper-
ties of the open-loop one, while the limit behaviour diﬀers, since:
lim
s→0
∂q∗i (t)
∂qj(t)
¯¯¯¯
CL
= lim
ρ→∞
∂q∗i (t)
∂qj(t)
¯¯¯¯
CL
= −1
2
;
lim
s→∞
∂q∗i (t)
∂qj(t)
¯¯¯¯
CL
= lim
ρ→0
∂q∗i (t)
∂qj(t)
¯¯¯¯
CL
= − N
2N + 1
. (40)
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Note that N/(2N + 1) > 1/3 for all N > 1, which entails that
Lemma 3 If price adjustment is instantaneous, the associated best reply at
the closed-loop memoryless equilibrium is steeper than the static Cournot best
reply for all N > 1.
The above Lemma entails that the limit of the optimal output and price
levels at the closed-loop equilibrium cannot coincide with the equilibrium
output and price generated by the static game. To ascertain this property,
we may invoke symmetry, and rewrite (36) as follows:
·
q = ρ (c− p+ q) + s [A− p+ q −N (p− c)] (41)
As in the open-loop case,
·
q = 0 is a linear relationship between p and q. This,
together with
·
p = 0, which is also a linear function, yields
pCL =
A [ρ+ s (N + 1)] +N (ρ+ sN) c
(N + 1) ρ+ (N2 +N + 1) s
; (42)
qCL =
(A− c) (ρ+ sN)
(N + 1) ρ+ (N2 +N + 1) s
.
as the unique steady state of the system. The dynamic system can be imme-
diately rewritten in matrix form to verify that the pair
©
pCL , qCL
ª
is stable
in the saddle sense. The proof of this is omitted for the sake of brevity.
Using (42), we may compute:
lim
s→0
qCL = lim
ρ→∞
qCL =
A− c
N + 1
; lim
s→0
pCL = lim
ρ→∞
pCL =
A+Nc
N + 1
; (43)
lim
s→∞
qCL = lim
ρ→0
qCL =
N (A− c)
N2 +N + 1
; lim
s→∞
pCL = lim
ρ→0
pCL =
A (N + 1) + cN2
N2 +N + 1
.
(44)
Clearly, the output and price levels in (44) are, respectively, larger and
smaller than the corresponding equilibrium values for the static game.
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From expression (30) and (43), we immediately draw the following impli-
cation:
Proposition 4 If the price is infinitely sticky, both the open-loop equilibrium
and the closed-loop memoryless one coincide with perfect competition for all
N ≥ 1.
Note that this result is not true in general for any closed-loop equilib-
ria. For instance, the feedback equilibrium investigated in Fershtman and
Kamien (1987) and Cellini and Lambertini (2004) does collapse into perfect
competition in the limit.
Our last result concerns the comparative evaluation of the slope of the
best reply across settings. Evaluating (26) against (39), we find:¯¯¯¯
∂q∗i (t)
∂qj(t)
¯¯¯¯
CL
>
¯¯¯¯
∂q∗i (t)
∂qj(t)
¯¯¯¯
OL
(45)
for all N > 1.
Proposition 5 The best reply associated with the closed-loop equilibrium is
steeper than the best reply associated with the open-loop equilibrium for all
N > 1.
The reason is that, when taking into account feedback eﬀects (35) for the
closed-loop solution, by definition each firm becomes more sensitive to the
rival’s behaviour, which makes her best reply steeper than in the open-loop
game. For a given intercept of the best reply function, this would imply
that firms produce more at the open-loop solution than at the closed-loop
one. However, comparing equilibrium outputs in the two settings, we have
that qCL > qOL, as we know from Fershtman and Kamien (1987) and Cellini
and Lambertini (2004). This is due to the fact that, indeed, the intercept of
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the closed-loop best reply is larger than the intercept of the open-loop best
reply, to such an extent that the resulting equilibrium outputs are higher in
the closed-loop case.
4 Conclusion
We have investigated the issue of intertemporal strategic interaction in diﬀer-
ential games. We have considered a Cournot model with sticky prices where
first order conditions do not identify best replies at any time during the
game. They only emerge in steady state, where one can check that (i) reac-
tion functions are negatively sloped, (ii) the feedback eﬀects accounted for
in the closed-loop solution entail that, in such a case, best replies are steeper
than under the open-loop solution; (iii) this notwithstanding, steady state
outputs at the closed-loop equilibrium are larger than the corresponding out-
put levels at the open-loop equilibrium, due to the fact that closed-loop best
replies are steeper but shifted outwards w.r.t. open-loop best replies. Finally,
in the case of infinitely sticky prices, then both types of equilibria replicate
the perfectly competitive outcome generated by the static model.
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